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유엔, '5~7만 국군포로 억류, 500명 생존하고 있을 것'
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북한인권위원회 보고서(2014년 2월) 중 관련 부분 번역,
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번역;金永男
2014년 2월 발표, 유엔 북한인권위원회(COI) 보고서 중 국군포로 관련 보고.
F. 외국인 납치
(b) 국군포로 송환 거부
861. 8만 2000명의 한국군이 한국 전쟁 이후 실종된 것으로 추측된다. 그 중 5만에서 7만 명의 한국군인은 북한이나 북한 동맹국에 억류됐다. 1952년 스탈린, 김일성, 주은래 회담 기록에 따르면 1952년 9월 북한 내 억류된 국군포로 수는 3만 5000명이었다. 김일성은 스탈린에게 휴전 협상시 전쟁포로수를 7500명으로 축소해 발표했다고 전했다. 김일성은 이에 추가로 2만 7000여 명의 공개되지 않은 포로가 있다고 했다. 이 회담에서 팽덕회 중공군 사령관은 중공군만 4만 명의 한국군을 포로로 잡아 왔다고 했다.
862. 1953년 4월부터 1954년 1월까지 8343명의 한국군 포로만 송환됐다. 본 위원회는(COI) 김일성과 팽덕회가 스탈린에 보고한 숫자에 이 숫자를 빼본 결과 최소 5만 명의 한국군 포로가 송환되지 못한 것으로 예상한다.
863. 북한에 억류된 포로 중 약 500명이 생존하고 있을 것으로 파악된다. 이들 중 약 400여 가구의 가족 구성원이 한국을 포함한 다른 나라에 거주하고 있다.
864. 국제인도법은 교전이 끝난 즉시 포로를 송환하도록 명시하고 있다. 또한 정전협정 역시 포로 송환 문제가 어떻게 이뤄져야 할지 상세히 설명돼 있다. 정전협정에 서명함으로써 양국은 : “전쟁포로의 송환은 본 정전협정이 효력을 발생한 후 60일 이내에 각방은 그 수용하에 있는 송환을 견지하는 전체 전쟁포로를 포로 된 당시에 그들이 속한 일방에 집단적으로 나누어 직접 송환 인도하며 어떠한 저해(沮害)도 가하지 못한다.”에 동의했다. <정전협정 3조 51항(ㄱ)>
865. 정전협정은 송환 절차에 있어 적십자의 역할도 명시돼 있다. 전쟁포로 송환 위원회는 송환 절차에 양국간 마찰이 있을시 중재 역할을 맡았다. 위원회는 송환 절차가 마무리되면 정전협정위원회에 의해 해산되게 돼 있었다. 국제법에 명시된 이런 의무 사항에도 불구하고 한국군 포로 송환은 북한 정부의 미(未)이행으로 이루어지지 않았다.
866. 북한, 러시어, 중국간 있었던 회담 자료에 따르면 김일성은 한국군 포로를 송환할 마음이 없던 것이 확실하다. 김일성은 이들을 인민군 소속으로 강제 입대시키면서 이들의 정확한 수와 행방을 감췄다. 김일성은 포로들을 인민군 소속으로 입대시켰다고 스탈린에게 보고하며 “1만 2000명을 포로로 잡고 있으며 이중 4416명이 외국인이라고 외부에 알렸다”며 “2만 7000명의 한국군 포로는 인민군으로 입대시켰고 공개하지 않았다”고 했다.
867. 본 위원회는 송환이 아니라 탈북한 한국군 포로의 증언을 채집했다. 2012년 9월까지 총 80명의 한국군 포로가 한국으로 돌아왔다. 증언에 따르면 전쟁 초기에 잡힌 포로들의 경우는 수 개월간 사상교육을 받고 “한국을 민주화시키는데 투입될 것이다”라며 인민군으로 징집됐다.
868. 포로 중 소수는 자원해서 인민군에 입대했다. 한 한국군 포로는 병원에서 부상자를 돕는 인민군 부대로 자원해서 들어갔다며 포로 취급을 받지 않고 여느 인민군과 같은 대우를 받을 수 있었다고 증언했다. 다른 증언에 따르면 자원해서 인민군에 입대한 포로들에게 ‘39’가 적힌 종이를 나눠 줬으며 한국이 붕괴되면 높은 자리를 약속했다고 한다.
869. 하지만 대다수의 포로는 강제로 징집됐으며 “공사(工事) 여단”으로 배치받았다. 이 여단은 북한 북부 지역의 탄광과 공장, 농장 등에서 강제노동을 하게 됐다. 이들은 이 강제노동소에서 1956년까지 생활했다. 정전협정 후 중공군과 소련군이 관리하던 포로들은 모두 북한에 넘겨졌고 이들 역시 같은 상황에 처하게 됐다.
870. 본 위원회에 증언한 사람들 모두 정전협정 후 송환되지 않은 계기에 대해 설명했다. 젊은 나이에 포로가 돼 50여 년이 흐른 뒤 탈북한 유병복 씨는 자신에게는 송환 기회가 주어진 적조차 없다고 했다. 그는 평안북도에서 600여 명의 다른 포로들과 탄광에서 일했다고 한다.
“우리는 탄광에서 강제적으로 일했습니다. 우리는 한국군 포로다, 왜 우리가 송환되지 못하냐, 왜 우리가 여기서 일해야 하나를 계속 물어봤습니다. 북한인들은 자신들도 모른다며 자신들도 지시받은 대로 할 뿐이라고 답했습니다. 우리는 이게 길어질 줄 몰랐습니다. 남북관계가 나아질 줄 알았죠. 지휘관들도 살아 있고, 한국 정부도 무사하고, 대통령도 살아 있으니 언젠가는 우리를 구하러 올 걸로 생각했습니다. 그래서 또 참고 기다렸습니다. 하지만 반세기가 흐르도록 아무도 우리를 구하러 오지 않았습니다. 그리고 북한은 우리를 이용했습니다.”
875. 탄광에서 일하는 포로들은 인민보안부와 보위부의 철저한 감시를 받았다. 조사 명목으로 각종 고문이 자행됐고 그들의 과거 살아왔던 일들은 상세하게 기록됐다. 북한정부가 이들의 탈출을 막기 위해 각별한 조치를 취했던 것으로 보인다. 본 위원회는 감시체계가 너무 심해 탈출 계획이 거의 성사되는 시점에서 발각됐다는 증언도 확인했다.
876. 한 포로는 평안북도 수용소에서 자신의 동료와 탈출을 시도했던 사례를 소개했다. 탈출 시도 중 여러 명이 총격을 받아 숨졌고 나머지는 체포돼 재판을 받았다고 한다. 조사 기간 중 북한군은 이 증인이 기억을 잃도록 전기 고문과 손톱을 제거하는 고문을 가했다고 한다. 재판에서 35명의 포로가 사형을 선고받았고, 당시 가장 어렸던 증인에게는 20년 형이 선고됐다.
877. 탈출을 기도한 수감자의 가족도 북한에서 자행되던 연좌제에 의해 죽음으로 이어졌다. 본 위원회는 남동생이 포로들의 탈출을 돕는 계획이 발각돼 함경북도의 한 보위부 수감소에서 죽게 된 여성의 이야기도 확인했다. 다른 증언에 따르면 나이 든 포로를 중국으로 탈출시키려 한 두 명의 북한인은 요덕수용소(15호)로 보내졌다. 한국으로 탈출한 한 포로는 자신의 탈북 후 아내는 자살했다고 했다. 연좌제로 아들이 위험해질까 걱정돼 자살을 결심했다는 설명이다.
878. 한국군 포로와 가족은 북한 계급 ‘성분’에서 최하위 계층에 속하게 됐고 그들의 후손도 지속적으로 차별을 당했다. 본 위원회는 포로와 후손들을 통해 어떤 차별을 받는지 확인했다. 포로의 자식들은 교육을 받지 못하며 부모와 같이 탄광일을 하게 됐다.
수십 년 후 탈북한 한 포로는 자신의 자식들이 ‘성분’ 때문에 할 수 있는 게 아무것도 없었다고 증언했다. 심해도 너무 심해 한 번은 그의 아들이 “대체 우리는 왜 태어난 거에요?”라고 물었다고 한다. 보위부 직원과 친해진 한 포로의 아들은 자신이 발급받은 서류에 적힌 ‘43’에 대해 알게 됐다고 한다. 43은 포로의 자식을 뜻한다.
879. 탈북해 증언한 모든 포로는 자신들의 탈출 이유로 자식들의 안녕(安寧)을 꼽았다. 후손들은 대대로 교육과 직업 선택에 제한을 받는다. 여성의 경우는 차별이 더욱 심하다. 포로의 자식인 것이 알려지면 자신보다 높은 ‘성분’의 사람과 결혼하기 어려워진다. 따라서 이들은 자신과 같은 ‘성분’들과 결혼하게 된다. 이 계급의 남성들은 대개 육체적 노동 때문에 젊은 나이에 요절하게 되고, 이 여성들은 혼자 남게 된다. 이렇게 반복되는 차별로 자신의 자식을 지키지 못할 거라는 자괴감에 자살하는 사례도 있었다.
880. 포로 중 인민군으로 자원한 경우 조금은 나은 대우를 받았다. 하지만 이들도 다른 포로들과 마찬가지로 제약을 받았다. 1951년 인민군에 자원한 한 포로는 병원에서 근무했고 그와 가족들은 포로 취급을 받지 않았다고 했다. 하지만 전쟁 후에는 황해도에 있는 홀동탄광에서 강제로 일하게 됐다고 했다. 그래도 지하에 들어가는 최악의 일은 피했다고 했다.
881. 종전 후 한국의 가족들은 포로들의 생사 여부를 포함해 아무것도 듣지 못했다. 물론 연락할 방법도 없었다. 2000년 남북정상회담 이후 양국은 적십자 회담을 통해 이들의 상봉을 약속했다. 2006년 2월 일곱 번째 남북 적십자 회담에서 전쟁 당시 실종자들의 생사 여부를 교환하겠다고 약속했다. 양국은 북한에 있는 한국군 포로와 한국 가족 상봉을 허가했다. 하지만 이들의 상봉은 이루어지지 않았다. 그들은 단지 몇 시간만 함께 할 수 있었다. 2차에서 19차 이산가족 상봉 기간(2000-2013) 동안 19명의 포로가 살아 있고 22명이 사망, 105명은 확인되지 않는다고 확인됐다. 이 중 17명만 가족을 만날 수 있었다. 2013년 5월 물망초 북한인권연구소가 설립됐고 이들은 송환되지 않은 포로들의 생사 여부를 파악하고 있다.
882. 북한 내 한국군 포로와 한국 내 가족들의 끝없는 상봉 노력에도 불구하고 북한 정부는 정전협정에 따라 포로 송환은 제대로 이뤄졌다고 주장한다. 북한은 현재 북한 내 있는 한국군 포로들은 모두 자의(自意)로 남아 있다고 주장한다. 탈북한 한 포로가 이는 사실이 아니라고 본 위원회에 증언했다.
유영복 씨 증언
“북한은 북한에 한국군 포로가 한 명도 없다고 주장합니다. 한국에 집이 있고, 부모나 형제가 있는데 왜 북한에 있길 원하겠습니까, 탄광 같은 곳에서 그렇게 힘들게 일하면서. 말도 안 되는 소리입니다. 북한은 아직도 그들이 자의로 머물고 있다고 주장합니다. 이제 그들 나이가 70, 80세가 다 돼갑니다. 북한 언론에 따르면 아직도 북한에 500여 명의 포로가 살아있다고 합니다. 북한은 이들 500명을 한국으로 돌려주지 않고 있습니다. 그리고 실제로 이들이 탈출하지 못하도록 하고 있습니다. 잡아서 처벌하고 죽이기까지 합니다. 북한은 포로들의 자식들도 학대합니다. 정말 반(反)인도적입니다. 한국 정부와 국제 사회는 이를 이해하고 북한 내 반인도적 범죄를 척결해야 합니다.”
가족상봉 문제는 어떻게 보느냐는 질문에 유씨는 이렇게 답했다.
“북한에 있는 포로들은 이제 80세가 다 돼갑니다. 북한에 자식과 손주들이 있습니다. 그 나이 든 할아버지 한 분을 한국으로 모셔 온다고 그들이 한국에서 잘 살겠습니까? 북한에 버리고 온 가족 생각에…그러니까 한국 정부가 이 문제를 해결하고 싶다면 포로뿐만 아니라 가족들까지 다 모시고 와야 합니다.”
883. 본 위원회는 미군을 포함한 유엔군 소속 실종군인에 대한 증언도 확인했다. 한국전쟁·냉전 포로 가족 연합회에 따르면 한국전 종전 후 살아있는데도 북한이 송환하지 않은 미군들이 있다. 연합회는 송환되지 않은 미군 수만 900명에서 4500명 정도가 될 것이라고 했다. 1952년 9월 소련, 북한, 중국 전략회담 자료에 따르면 8000명의 미군이 중공군에 포로로 잡혔고, 4000명이 북한에 잡혔다. 이날 회담에서 중공군 사령관 팽덕회는 “많은 외국 포로들이 물자 부족으로 죽었다”고 했다. 실종 미군 가족들은 북한, 중국, 러시아, 미국에 자료를 요청하고 있지만, 모두 비협조적이라고 했다. 이들은 비통에 잠겨 있다.
▼ 이하 발췌 부분 원문
(b) 1953: denial of repatriation to prisoners of war from the Korean War
1. At the time of the end of the Korean War, an estimated 82,000 members of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces were missing.[1] Estimates of those taken as prisoners of war (POWs) and detained in the DPRK, or other countries allied to the DPRK, range between 50,000 and 70,000.[2] According to the Soviet Union’s protocol of a meeting between Stalin, Kim Il-sung, Zhou Enlai and other senior officials, in September 1952 the DPRK held 35,000 ROK POWs.[3] Kim Il-sung conveyed to Stalin that during the Armistice negotiations, the DPRK had only acknowledged to have taken about 7500 ROK soldiers as POWs. . According to Kim Il-sung, there were an additional 27,000 POWs, whose existence had not been revealed to the other side or the media. In the same meeting, Chinese General Peng Denhuai, who commanded the Chinese volunteer forces in the DPRK, indicated that since Chinese forces had entered the war, they had taken 40,000 POWs from the ROK.[4]
2. Only 8,343 POWs were returned to the ROK in the immediate aftermath of the armistice between April 1953 and January 1954.[5] On the basis of the discrepancy between this figure and in the numbers reported by Kim Il-sung and Peng Denhuai to Stalin, the Commission finds that at least 50,000 POWs from the ROK were not repatriated.
3. It is estimated that approximately 500 survivors among them are still being held in the DPRK.[6] They have 400 POW family members who live in the ROK or elsewhere outside the DPRK.[7]
4. International Humanitarian Law requires that prisoners of war must be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.[8] In addition, the Armistice Agreement established express obligations as to when and through which mechanisms repatriation of POWs was to occur.[9] By signing the Armistice Agreement, each State party agreed to:
[W]ithin sixty (60) days after this agreement becomes effective each side shall, without offering any hindrance, directly repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in its custody who insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture.[10]
5. The Agreement detailed how the Red Cross would facilitate the repatriation efforts. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War would mediate any disputes as to the arrangements.[11] The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War was to be dissolved by the Military Armistice Committee upon completion of the programme of repatriation of prisoners of war.[12] Despite these obligations under international law, thousands of ROK Prisoners of War were not repatriated, nor fairly offered the prospect of repatriation, by the DPRK.
6. It is clear from contemporary discussions between leaders from the DPRK, the Soviet Union and China, found in archived documents, that Kim Il-sung did not intend to return all the prisoners of war in his control. Rather, the DPRK had concealed the existence and whereabouts of the majority of ROK POWs by transferring them to KPA unit. Kim Il-sung reported to Stalin that the existence of the POWs thus transferred had been kept a secret from observers :
“According to the list which we have submitted we have taken a total of 12,000 men prisoner, of which 4,416 are foreigners and the rest South Koreans. Among the prisoners are 300 American pilots, of which more than 30 are officers. About 27,000 South Koreans have transferred to units of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army. These POWs have not been reported in the press.”[13] (emphasis added)
7. The Commission received testimony from several South Korean POWs who were not repatriated but managed to escape the DPRK in their advanced years. By September 2012, 80 former Korean War POWs have returned to the ROK.[14] According to the testimonies received, and reports on the issue, POWs captured in the early years of the war received re-education (ideological training) for several months before being enlisted in the KPA,[15] being told that “they will now be participating in liberating ROK”.[16]
8. A minority voluntarily joined the DPRK army. A former POW explained that as he joined the Korean People’s Army voluntarily working in a hospital for the injured, he was no longer treated as a POW and was afforded the same benefits as DPRK soldiers after the war.[17] Another former POW told the Commission that those who joined the DPRK voluntarily after capture had their documentation papers were marked with “no 39”, and they were promised positions of responsibility when the South fell.[18]
9. For the vast majority however, being (non-voluntarily) enlistees in the KPA meant being regrouped into “construction brigades”. These were composed entirely of POWs, who were forced to work in coal mines, factories and farm villages in the northern-most parts of the country.[19] POWs were kept in camps at these forced labour sites during and after the war, until 1956.[20] After the signing of the armistice, POWs who had been in the custody of the Chinese and Soviet forces were handed over to the DPRK and ended up in the same situation.[21]
10. Each person in that position who gave evidence to the Commission told of how the opportunity to be repatriated was not fairly offered to them after the armistice in 1953.
• Mr Yoo Young-bok, who became a POW as a young man and only managed to escape after more than 50 years in the DPRK, testified that repatriation was never offered him. Instead, he and 600 other POWs were forced to work in a mine in North Pyongan Province:
“We were forced to work this mine and we said we are South Korean, POWs, why are we not being exchanged, why are we working in the mines, we asked these questions. And the North Koreans said they don’t know why and they just said we should do what we are told to do. … we thought this wouldn’t last long. We thought that relations between South and North Korea would improve. And because all the officers were alive, and because the South Korean government was there, because the president was there, we thought they would one day come looking for us trying to save us. So we decided to be patient and wait… but 5 decades have passed and nobody came looking for us and tried to save us. And North Korea just used us.”[22]
11. Others spoke of being fearful of truthfully responding to questioning about their desire to be repatriated for fear of persecution. In one instance, a witness described how those who had answered affirmatively, indicating they wished to be repatriated, were shot.[23] The majority however testified that they were not asked whether they wished to be repatriated. One witness explained that anyone who spoke up against the denial of repatriation was tied up in the camp.[24]
12. In 1956-57, most of the POWs were released from the KPA and became civilians.[25] Upon decommissioning, POWs were typicallysent to work in mines in remote provinces where they remained until their death.[26]
• At the Seoul Public Hearing, former POW Mr Yoo Young-bok described how he believed he would be repatriated to South Korea after the armistice in July 1953, but instead in August 1953 he was sent to perform “incredibly difficult”, “back-breaking” forced labour in a mine in the DPRK. He told the Commission:
“I didn’t do anything wrong in North Korea. I served 47 years in North Korea. I did everything they asked me to do. I was in forced labour for decades. I did nothing wrong in North Korea... So before I die, it was my wish to return to my hometown where my family lived and I was going to testify about what North Korea did.”[27]
13. The conditions in the mines were treacherous, and work conditions severe.[28] Many workers enslaved in the mines died from accidents or diseases contracted in the mines caused by the dust.[29] Incidents such as explosions tearing off limbs or flesh, collapses in the mines engulfing workers and deaths resulting from crushing or cutting by machinery are not uncommon.[30] Conditions were so bad, and deaths and severe injuries so common, that according to one witness there was a saying “Don’t ever allow your daughter to marry a coal miner”, meaning a woman married to a coal miner is likely to become widowed and subsequently without a male’s income.[31] The witness estimates that 20 per cent of miners did not reach the retirement age of 60.
• Mr Yoo Young-bok explained:
“Working in the mines, it’s very primitive. One of the mines I used to work in, we had to go as deep as 1,000 metres. And the air was bad, and the work itself was back-breaking. I think even the North Koreans say that that is the mine with the most intense workload. The way we worked there was very primitive – there were no tools.”[32]
14. POWs who complained about their treatment or advocated for return to the ROK were sent to prisons, political prison camps or just disappeared.[33] This resulted in a climate of fear within the construction brigades and mines which prevented workers from criticizing or protesting against working conditions, let alone organizing a strike.
• Mr Yoo Young-bok testified:
“They took us forcefully to mines. Of course some of my comrades or colleagues asked why they are not sending us back to our homes when we are POWs. So there were some who stood up. And they were just telling us that we should do what we were told to do. So there was a lot of peer pressure. And those who stood up against the North Koreans were publicly executed or were secretly transported. I learned later that they were taken to the political prisons. So most of us decided to keep quiet, because we knew, if we complained that we would only be victimized further.”[34]
• Another former POW who managed to escape, also emphasized that they were not allowed to complain and got severely punished if they did. He recalled the case of a fellow POW, Mr Oh Sam Jun, who once said aloud that he wanted to be sent back to ROK. The man was charged with a political crime and sentenced to 15 years in a kyohwaso. Eventually he reappeared at the coal mine. Soon thereafter, he disappeared again forever.[35]
15. POWs forced to work in the coal mines were under particularly strict surveillance by the MPS and SSD.[36] Interrogations by these agencies (often involving torture) were commonplace for POWs, and every detail of their lives was known and recorded.[37] Particular effort appears to have been made by the DPRK government to monitor and prevent escape of POWs and Korean War abductees. The Commission also heard testimonies of escape plans that were uncovered or thwarted at the last moment by the SSD as a result of their comprehensive surveillance.
16. A former POW described his brigade’s attempt at escape from a POW camp in North Pyongan Province. Several POWs were shot at the time of the incident, and the rest captured and tried. During pre-trial investigations, the witness was tortured with electricity and had his fingernails forcibly removed resulting in memory loss. At trial, 35 POWs were sentenced to death, and as the youngest in the brigade, the witness was sentenced to 20 years.[38]
17. Thwarted escape attempts have also resulted in the deaths of family members due to the guilt by association policy employed in the DPRK. The Commission heard of the interrogation and subsequent death in a SSD detention facility in North Hamgyong Province of a woman after her brother’s plans to assist POWs in escaping was foiled.[39] Another witness provided testimony about two people who were sent to political prison camp (kwanliso) No. 15 at Yodok because they were attempting to assist two elderly POWs cross into China in an effort to return to the ROK.[40] A former POW told the Commission of his wife’s suicide after his escape from the DPRK, presumably in an attempt to save her son from a previous marriage from being tarnished by the guilt by association policy.[41]
18. Like the Korean War abductees, as POWs and their families were categorized into the lowest rank of songbun, their descendants also suffered from the discrimination levied against the POWs. The Commission heard evidence from many POWs and descendants of POWs about the discrimination they faced. For example, children of POWs were denied access to higher education. They were directed to work in the same mines as their family and generally were forced to take the worst jobs in the mines.[42]
• A POW who returned to the ROK after escaping from the DPRK decades after the war told the Commission how there was little opportunity for his children in the DPRK to flourish because of their songbun classification. So much so that his son once asked him “why [were] we even born?”[43]
• The son of a POW working in the same mine as his father discovered, after befriending a security officer, that his documents were marked with the number 43, the number used for children of POWs.
19. The POWs who gave evidence to the Commission all spoke of seeking better opportunities for their children born in the DPRK as the primary reason for their decision to flee. Children and grandchildren are routinely denied access to education or employment opportunities. Daughters are further discriminated against as they find it much harder to marry a man of better songbun if discovered to be the child of a POW.[44] Marriage options for daughters and granddaughters of POWs are thus limited to men of equally low songbun. This perpetuates the cycle of discrimination and increases the chances of being widowed at an early age, as men of the lowest level of songbun are forced to work in difficult and life threatening environments such as mines. The discrimination faced by descendants has, on occasion, led to the death by suicide of POWs who feel incapable of improving the lives of their children.[45]
20. POWs who joined the KPA voluntarily after capture were treated somewhat better. However ultimately they too were subjected to the same restrictions on freedoms as the general population.[46]
• One witness told the Commission that because he agreed to serve for the KPA in a hospital after being taken in 1951, he was never considered a POW and his family faced no discrimination. After the war, he was assigned to work in the Hol Dong Goldmine in Hwanghae Province without his consent, but his position did not require him to work underground.[47]
21. After the war, families in the ROK of unreturned POWs held in the DPRK did not receive any information about the fate of their POW family members. Nor could they have contact with them. After the Inter-Korean Summit in June 2000, the DPRK and ROK agreed to address the problem of POWs along with separated families in the South-North Ministerial Meeting and the South-North Red Cross Meeting.[48] In February 2006, at the 7th South-North Red Cross meeting, both sides agreed to include confirmation of life or death of “people whose identities are not known at the wartime and after” with that of separated families. These steps taken on both sides to establish contact between POWs in the North and their families in the South are welcome. However they have not resulted in contact with families for most of the POWs estimated to be alive in the North. They have permitted no more than a few mere hours of contact time for some families.[49] From 2nd to 19th during the South-North Separated Family Reunions (2000-2013), 19 POWs were confirmed to be alive in the DPRK, 22 dead, and 105 could not be confirmed. Just 17 POWs were able to meet their ROK families in family reunions. In May 2013, an organization in the ROK called “Dream Makers for North Korea” established a centre for registration of POWs. The centre seeks to determine whether unreturned POWs are still alive.[50]
22. Despite commitment to establish contact between POWs in the DPRK and their families in the ROK, the DPRK maintains that the issue of POWs was settled at the time of exchange of POWs in accordance with the Armistice Agreement. They contend that all POWs remaining in the DPRK are there voluntarily.[51] The former POWs who provided evidence to the Commission all refuted the assertion by the DPRK that POWs remain in the country voluntarily.
• In Seoul, Mr Yoo Young-bok, elaborated:
“North Korea continues to maintain that there is not one South Korean POW in North Korea. If you have a home in South Korea, if you have parents and siblings in South Korea, why would anybody want to stay in North Korea, working in these incredibly difficult working conditions of the mine? This is just unreasonable. And still the North Koreans continue to maintain that the POWs in North Korea are there because they wanted to. Now these men have become 70, 80, and according to the North Korean press, there are about 500 of such POWs alive [in the DPRK at present]. The North Korean Government is not letting these 500 people to go to South Korea. And they are actually preventing them from escaping or leaving to South Korea. They catch them and punish them and execute them. And they also repress the children of the POWs – this is completely inhumane. The South Korean government as well as the international community should understand this and try to solve the human rights problem in North Korea.”[52]
• Further, on the issue of permanently reuniting POWs of war in the DPRK with their families in the ROK, Mr Yoo pleaded:
“[A]ll the POWs (alive) in North Korea would be over 80 years old. … [T]hey have children they have grandchildren in North Korea. If you just bring one old guy from North Korea to South Korea, how will they live in South Korea because they have their families back in the North? So if South Korean government wanted to resolve this issue, they should be able to bring the families of the POWs in North Korea together to South Korea.”[53]
23. The Commission heard allegations, relating to the fate of missing soldiers serving under the United Nations Command, particularly soldiers from the United States of America. According to the Coalition of Families of Korean and Cold War Prisoners of War and Persons Missing in Action, at the end of the Korean War during the exchanges of prisoners some United States soldiers, who were known to have been alive and in captivity with those who had been released, were not handed over by the DPRK authorities. The Coalition alleges that they numbered more than 900 and that the total figure could be as high as 4,500.[54] According to the transcript of a strategy meeting between the leaders of the Soviet, DPRK and Chinese forces, in September 1952, 8,000 American soldiers were held by Chinese forces, and approximately 4,000 foreigners were held by the DPRK. In the same meeting, the Commander of the Chinese forces Peng Denhuai acknowledged that “many of the foreign POWs have died in view of the difficult material conditions”.[55] The families of US military men who did not return have sought information from the DPRK, China, Russia and the United States. However, many complain that they have not received sufficient cooperation. This has caused much anguish.[56]
[1] The United Nations Command at the time of the armistice estimated 82,000 of the Korean Armed Forces to be missing: KINU, White Paper of Human Rights in North Korea (2013), p. 541.
[2] Heo Man-ho, “North Korea’s Continued Detention of South Korean POWs since the Korean and Vietnam Wars”, The Korean Journal of Defence Analysis, vol. 14, No. 2 (Fall 2002), p. 142 Wada Haruki, The Korean War (New York, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013), p. 289.
[3] Soviet Union verbatim “Record of a Conversation between Stalin, Kim Il Sung, Pak Heon-yeong, Zhou Enlai, and Peng Dehuai”, 4 September 1952, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Translated into English from the original by Gary Goldberg. Available from: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncentre.org/document/114936.
[4] It is unclear from the conversation about the ROK POWs whether the approximately 8000 ROK POWs that have been listed for repatriation are in addition to the 40,000 held by Chinese forces, or are 8000 of the 40,000 ROK POWs held by Chinese forces.
[5] KINU, White Paper of Human Rights in North Korea (2013), p. 541.
[6] See KINU, White Paper of Human Rights in North Korea (2013), p. 541, and Seoul Public Hearing witness Mr Yoo Young-bok, 23 August 2013, afternoon (00:20:30). Institute for Unification Education “Issue of Abductees and POWs” 2012 cites the number of surviving POWs to be approximately 560.
[7] KINU, White Paper of Human Rights in North Korea (2013), p. 542.
[8] Article 118, first paragraph, of the 1949 Geneva Convention III, which the DPRK has ratified, provides: “Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities”. Building on state practice harkening back to the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907, this obligation also emerges from Customary International Humanitarian Law. See International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian Law, vol.1 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 451 [Rule 128].
[9] The Korean Armistice Agreement, article III, 51 – 58.
[10] The Korean Armistice Agreement, article III, 51 (a).
[11] The Korean Armistice Agreement, article III, 56 (b).
[12] Armistice Agreement, article III, 56 (c).
[13] Kim Il-sung, as cited in the Soviet Union’s verbatim “Record of a Conversation between Stalin, Kim Il Sung, Pak Heon-yeong, Zhou Enlai, and Peng Dehuai”, 04 September 1952, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Translated by Gary Goldberg. Available from http://digitalarchive.wilsoncentre.org/document/114936.
[14] KINU, White Paper of Human Rights in North Korea (2013), p. 542.
[15] TBG015 and TJH029.
[16] TBG008.
[17] TJH030.
[18] TBG021.
[19] TBG007, TBG008, TBG015, TBG021, TJH029, TJH016.
[20] TBG021, TBG015.
[21] TJH029.
[22] Seoul Public Hearing, 23 August 2013, afternoon (00:08:00).
[23] TBG021.
[24] TJH029.
[25] TBG007, TBG008.
[26] TBG007, TBG008, TBG015, TBG021, TJH029.
[27] Seoul Public Hearing, 23 August 2013, afternoon (00:39:00).
[28] TBG021, TJH029, TJH030 and Seoul Public Hearing witness Mr Yoo Young-bok, 23 August 2013, afternoon.
[29] TJH029, TBG021.
[30] TBG021, TJH029.
[31] TJH029.
[32] Seoul Public Hearing, 23 August 2013, afternoon (00:14:30).
[33] TJH029, TJH016.
[34] Seoul Public Hearing, 23 August 2013, afternoon (00:11:00).
[35] TJH029.
[36] TBG015, TBG002, TBG007.
[37] TBG002.
[38] TBG002.
[39] TJH024.
[40] TJH009.
[41] TBG002.
[42] TBG021, TBG008, TJH029, TBG015, TBG002.
[43] TJH029.
[44] TJH024.
[45] TJH029.
[46] TJH030.
[47] TJH030.
[48] KINU, White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea (2013).
[49] See section IV.F for a detailed description of the Separated Family Reunions.
[50] The Centre’s Korean name is Mulmangcho. Mulmangcho website. Available from http://www.mulmangcho.org/?c=2/21&p=2&uid=1310.
[51] A/HRC/13/13, para. 81 (4 January 2010).
[52] Seoul Public Hearing, 23 August 2013, afternoon (00:20:00).
[53] Seoul Public Hearing, 23 August 2013, afternoon (00:51:00).
[54] John Zimmerlee, Washington Public Hearing, 31 October 2013, afternoon (00:12:00).
[55] “Record of a Conversation between Stalin, Kim Il Sung, Pak Heon-yeong, Zhou Enlai, and Peng Dehuai”, 04 September 1952, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg. Available from http://digitalarchive.wilsoncentre.org/document/114936.
[56] Washington Public Hearing, 31 October 2013, afternoon. Also, Submission to the Commission: Mark Sauter and John Zimmerlee, American Trophies: How US POWs Were Surrendered to North Korea, China and Russia by Washington’s “Cynical Attitude” (Lexington, Kentucky, 2013)
출처;조갑제닷컴
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