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인터넷타임즈
> 뉴스
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"한국 국회의사당을 포격하는 것과 같은 행위"
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'한국이 화를 안 내면 미국으로선 도울 방법이 없다.'
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趙甲濟
타임誌는 최근, 한국 영해에서 어뢰로 한국 군함을 격침시키는 것은 북한군이 한국 국회의사당에 대포를 쏘는 것과 같은데도 한국 정부는 武力보복을 할 생각을 하지 않고 있는 것 같다고 꼬집었다.
헤리티지 재단의 브루스 클린거너 연구원은 자신의 칼럼에서 이렇게 썼다.
<한국이 보복하기를 꺼린다면 미국으로선 더 강경한 대응을 주장함으로써 한국인보다 더 한국적으로 행동할 수가 없을 것이다>
(If South Korea is reluctant to attack, it would be impossible for the US to be “more Korean than the Koreans” by advocating stronger measures.)
심지어 뉴욕타임스는 '이명박 대통령이 북한 도발이란 증거를 발견하더라도 숨기려 할지 모른다'는 요지의 전문가 견해를 소개하기도 하였다.
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You can't quite set your watch by it — Kim Jong Il is not that predictable — but every year (and sometimes more than once) the regime in North Korea does something that reminds the world, yet again, of two things: just how beyond the pale the government in Pyongyang is, and just how powerless the rest of the world is to do anything consequential about it.
Just over a month ago, while sailing off the western coast of South Korea, a South Korean naval ship, the 1200-ton Cheonan, was cut nearly in half by an explosion, and sunk swiftly thereafter. Forty-six sailors died. After weeks of confusion about what, exactly, happened — Was it attacked? Had some of its own on-board munitions exploded? Had it accidentally struck a mine? — the South Korea government has now come very close to endorsing the conclusion expressed publicly April 24 by its Defense Minister Kim Tae Young that "a heavy torpedo is most likely the cause of the sinking." (See pictures of the rise of Kim Jong Il.)
Kim didn't specifically say it was a North Korean torpedo. He didn't need to nor necessarily does the South Korean government want to. "South Korea is now like a CSI investigator who, upon seeing a dead body with a bullet hole in the forehead refuses to rule out a heart attack as the cause of death since the only suspect in the room with a pistol is a vicious gangland boss," says Bruce Klingner, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation and a former CIA analyst. "Better to engage in a lengthy investigation, both to gather irrefutable evidence and to delay the inevitable day of reckoning."
The gangster analogy is apt. It precisely captures the dynamic that keeps the North's relations with the outside world pretty much exactly where they've been for the past 20 years. As long as Kim & Co. don't do anything truly crazy, like start bombing Seoul, there is virtually nothing that South Korea, the U.S. or anyone else can do to constrain their smaller acts of war. And make no mistake, shooting a torpedo that sinks a South Korean ship in South Korea's own waters is an act of war, no less than a North Korean artillery attack on the South Korean parliament building in Seoul would be.
It's just that smaller acts of war cannot be allowed to matter. Hillary Clinton infuriated many South Koreans when she said on April 22 that she hopes "there is no talk of war, there is no action or miscalculation that could provoke a response that might lead to conflict. That's not in anyone's interest." The Secretary of State also added that "the way to resolve the outstanding differences [between the Koreas] was for the North to return to the six-party talk framework [which involves trying to bribe the North into giving up its nuclear weapons] as soon as possible." Though the State Department says Clinton's message was aimed at Pyongyang, that's not the way a lot of people in the South took it. To them it sounded like 46 South Korean sailors lie at the bottom of the sea, but God forbid South Korea do anything that might "lead to conflict." (See pictures of North Koreans at the polls.)
However politically tone deaf that remark might have been in substance, pretty much everyone in Seoul, up to and including President Lee Myung Bak, understands it's also correct. To be sure, there have been hawkish noises in Seoul in the wake of the Cheonan's sinking, including some coming from surprising sources. Kim Jang-soo, the former defense minister under the late Roo Moo Hyun (as dovish and non-confrontational a President as his predecessor, Kim Dae Jung) told TIME Wednesday that "both military and non-military actions have to be considered," including "a possible naval blockade and the striking of a limited military target." Kim has since switched parties since he worked for Roh — he's now a member of Lee Myung Bak's ruling Grand National Party — but his public comment shows just how raw emotions are in Seoul at the moment.
But the notion that a conflict might, in fact, build from here is remote. President Lee himself has already said he "had no intention of invading the North," and even the anger and sorrow now evident in South Korea does not create an appetite for war. People want the North to be punished, but not militarily.
That means Seoul's options are extremely limited. Hyundai Asan's $1 billion investment in the Mt. Geumgang tourist area in the North already looks like a goner, since Seoul suspended tourism in July 2008 when a 53-year-old South Korean woman accidentally walked into an off-limits military zone and was shot dead by North Korean soldiers. There is almost no food aid going from South to North now. So the most obvious target for tighter economic sanctions is the Kaesong industrial complex, which currently houses factories for some 120 South Korean companies just across the demilitarized zone in the North. Nearly 40,000 North Koreans work there for minimal wages, and feeding them would be an additional burden on the North at a time when famine is, by many accounts, again becoming a problem. But no one believes shutting Kaesong would be a crippling blow indeed, Pyongyang itself has been threatening to shut the complex unless the South agrees to normalize inter-Korean relations.
As always, that leaves a lot of people casting longing glances at Beijing. If only the mighty Chinese would now kick into gear, shutting down trade with the North to punish them. It's unlikely to happen, not to any significant degree anyway. Victor D. Cha, former director of Asian affairs on George W. Bush's national security council, doesn't even think Beijing would sign on to tighter U.N. sanctions limiting the North's ability to buy conventional naval weaponry. Remember: The Chinese, like Washington, have been hoping to get the North to return to the hallowed six-party talks. All year, there have been rumors in Seoul and Beijing that a visit by Kim Jong Il to the Chinese capital was imminent.
Under the circumstances, it's going to be tough to get the South Koreans all excited again about those talks. (Asked whether this incident will impact efforts to restart them, Cha, now at the Center for Strategic and International studies in Washington, deadpans: "It certainly doesn't help.") But since the first term of the Bush administration, when a tougher North Korea policy led Pyongyang to accelerate its nuclear program, the outside world has had no stomach for any confrontation with Pyongyang. It still doesn't.
In June, the U.S. and South Korea, among others, will commemorate the 60th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean war. Like six other South Korean sailors killed in an incident in 2002, and like 115 civilians killed when North Korean spies blew up a Korean Airlines plane in 1987, the 46 who died last month are but the latest casualties in a war that, 60 years on, has never really ended.
— With reporting by Stephen Kim / Seoul
crime scene investigation
Seoul, South Korea – It is becoming increasingly obvious that a North Korean torpedo caused the March 26th sinking of a South Korean naval ship. The Cheonan, a 1200 ton corvette, was severed cleanly in half, a characteristic of torpedo attack rather than a naval mine. Seoul has already ruled out an internal explosion, running aground, or other accident as the cause.
My discussions with government officials in Seoul this week revealed uncharacteristic reticence and nervousness. South Korea is now like a CSI investigator who, upon seeing a dead body with a bullet hole in the forehead refuses to rule out a heart attack as the cause of death since the only suspect in the room with a pistol is a vicious gangland boss. Better to engage in a lengthy investigation, both to gather irrefutable evidence and to delay the inevitable day of reckoning.
Everything in South Korea is on hold pending the outcome of the investigation. Government contacts are reluctant to be drawn into discussions of hypothetical policy responses. Some newspapers, public organizations, and legislators have called for a strong response but have yet to gain traction with the populace whose mood is predominantly one of mourning.
It appears the public is angry, but not angry enough to advocate military strikes against North Korea that could escalate into an unpredictable all-out conflict. At this point, it appears unlikely for Seoul to contemplate a military attack. There is repeated precedent for both South Korea and the US not responding militarily to previous North Korean attacks, even when they resulted in loss of life.
All of that could change, however, upon the final conclusion of the ponderous investigation. Ironically, Seoul appears concerned by both potential outcomes, namely either too much or too little evidence. A clear verdict of North Korea’s finger on the trigger could inflame the public to demand a stronger military response than either Seoul or Washington would be comfortable with.
Conversely, strong suspicion but a lack of irrefutable evidence will constrain Seoul’s policy options. South Korea will contemplate both unilateral actions, including punitive economic and diplomatic measures, as well as taking the issue to the UN Security Council for multilateral response. In the latter case, Seoul would face stiff opposition from China and Russia, which have obstructed previous attempts to punish Pyongyang for violating UN resolutions.
If South Korea is reluctant to attack, it would be impossible for the US to be “more Korean than the Koreans” by advocating stronger measures. But the Obama administration should consult closely with the South Koreans and support whatever action they are comfortable taking. This should include pressing the Chinese and Russians to relent in favor of tougher international sanctions, and taking unilateral punitive action that complements the South Korean approach.
Some South Koreans were sharply critical of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s recent comment that she hoped there would be “no action or miscalculation that could provoke a response that might lead to conflict [and] the way to resolve the outstanding differences among [the Koreas was] to return to the six-party talks framework as soon as possible.”
This value-neutral, even-handed approach to North and South Korea when Seoul was clearly the aggrieved party resurrected memories of Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s insulting 1996 comment calling upon both Koreas to show restraint after North Korean special forces killed 10 South Korea citizens.
All told, the Cheonan crisis is taking place at a time of very solid bilateral relations between the US and South Korea. The strength of this alliance contrasts sharply with Washington’s troubled relationship with its Japanese ally. A united US-Korea response to North Korean provocation underscores the value of alliance with the U.S.
One wonders how the US-Japanese alliance would respond today to a similar crisis.
[ 2010-05-04, 01:23 ] 조회수 : 267
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